The Design of Optimal Conservation Programs by Electric Utilities Considering Strategic Consumer Behavior

DOI10.1287/MNSC.42.3.404MaRDI QIDQ4363576zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Franz Wirl

Publication date 15 December 1997

Published in Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.42.3.404

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardoptimal mechanism designstrategic reactions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

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• Extending Bayesian structural time-series estimates of causal impact to many-household conservation initiatives
• Incentives and security in electricity distribution networks
• How we decide shapes what we choose: decision modes track consumer decisions that help decarbonize electricity generation
• When does eco-efficiency rebound or backfire? An analytical model
• Exploring the behavioral and welfare implications of social-comparison messages in residential water and electricity

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