Contracting Structures for Custom Software Development: The Impacts of Informational Rents and Uncertainty on Internal Development and Outsourcing

DOI10.1287/MNSC.43.12.1726MaRDI QIDQ4385338zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors E. T. G. Wang, Terry Barron, Abraham Seidmann

Publication date 13 April 1998

Published in Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.43.12.1726

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingexternalitiesoutsourcingrevelation principlesoftware developmentrelationship-specific investmentinformational asymmetry

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Case-oriented studies in operations research (90B90)

Recommendations

• Market Provision of Custom Software: Learning Effects and Low Balling
• Outsourcing timing, contract selection, and negotiation
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Cited in

(1)

• Outsourcing to suppliers with unknown capabilities

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