scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1163366
Ever since its inception in the work of \textit{G. H. von Wright} [Mind 60, 1-15 (1951)], deontic logic has been developed primarily as a species of modal logic. I argue in this paper, however, that, at least for certain purposes, the techniques recently developed within the field of nonmonotonic logic may provide a better theoretical framework for the formal study of normative reasoning than the usual modal treatment. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews three logical approaches to conflicting oughts: the accounts provided by standard modal logic and by a weaker modal logic, and then an account set out by \textit{B. van Fraassen} [J. Philos. 70, 5-19 (1973)]. I argue that, of these options, only van Fraassen's account is intuitively adequate; but as it turns out, this approach cannot be interpreted in any natural way within the framework of modal logic. Section 3 introduces one of the most familiar formalisms for nonmonotonic reasonings, \textit{R. Reiter}'s default logic [Artif. Intell. 13, 81-132 (1980; Zbl 0435.68069)] and then reviews a result, first presented in the author's contribution ``Some direct theories of nonmonotonic inheritance in: D. M. Gabbay et al. (eds.), Handbook of logic in artificial intelligence and logic programming. Vol. 3: Nonmonotonic reasoning and uncertain reasoning, 111-187 (1994; Zbl 0804.03017), that justifies an interpretation of van Fraassen's deontic logic into Reiter's default logic. Section 4 explores some technical points concerning van Fraassen's account, and then develops three variant approaches. I believe that these variant approaches, like van Fraassen's original account, likewise reflect stable and coherent strategies for reasoning with conflicting oughts; but again, they cannot be interpreted naturally within modal logic. Section 5 reviews two ways in which conditional ought statements have been formalized within the framework of modal logic, and then points out a shared difficulty that renders each of these treatments inadequate as a formalization of prima facie oughts. Section 6 begins by sketching a way in which this problem might be addressed within the framework of nonmonotonic logic. A number of issues concerning conditional reasoning in the nonmonotonic framework are still unsettled, however, and so the section concludes by surveying some of the ways in which these open questions bear upon the preliminary sketch. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0885.00033].
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