scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1984275

MaRDI QIDQ4428709zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Roman Murawski

Publication date 22 September 2003

zbMATH Keywords

incompletenessprovability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) History of mathematical logic and foundations (03-03) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) First-order arithmetic and fragments (03F30)

Review text

Even mathematics does not give the possibility to develop pure and unambiguous concepts of proof and truth. The author considers some historical, philosophical and logical facts regarding the distinction between proof and truth. The influence of Gödel's incompleteness theorems on the subject is discussed, as well as the role of the undefinability of truth vs. definability of provability and the role of finitary vs. infinitary methods. The paper contains interesting historical remarks and philosophical conclusions based on contemporary results in the field of Peano arithmetic, particularly concerned with the use of infinitary inference rules. For the entire collection see [Zbl 1017.00016].

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(4)

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