The Role of Turnover Costs in the Enforcement of Performance-Related Pay Contracts

DOI10.1111/1467-999X.00159MaRDI QIDQ4483690zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yaffa Machnes

Publication date 2003

Published in Metroeconomica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-999x.00159

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cited in

(4)

• Public versus Private Retirement Pensions: A Stackelberg Differential Game
• Pensionmetrics 2: Stochastic pension plan design during the distribution phase.
• Pensionomics. On the role of PAYGO in pension portfolios.
• Pensions in Labor Contracts

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