scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1474757

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Publication:4489333





Let \(G= (N, (A-i)_{i\in N}, (u_i)_{i\in N})\) be a game in strategic form where \(N\) is the finite set of players, \(|N|= n\), \(a_i\neq \emptyset\) is the set of player's \(i\) strategies and \(u_i: A=\prod_{j\in N} A_j\to R^1\) is the payoff function of player \(i\in N\). Let \(n\geq 2\), \(x\in A\) is a strong \((n-1)\) equilibrium \(\text{SNE}^{n-1}\) if for every player \(i\in N\) the following condition holds: \[ \forall S\subset N\setminus \{i\},\;\forall y_S\in A_S,\;\exists j\in S: u_j(x)\geq u_j\;(y_S, x_{N\setminus S}). \] Similarly, strictly strong \((n-1)\) equilibrium \((\text{SSNE}^{n-1})\), one-person rationality (OPR), consistency (CONS), \((n-1)\)-Pareto optimality \((\text{PO}^{n-1})\), converse consistency for \(\text{SSNE}^{n-1}\) (COCONSb) are defined. The final result of this paper is stated below: A solution \(Q\) on an \(r\)-closed family of games \(\Gamma\) satisfies CONS, OPR, \(\text{PO}^{n-1}\), \(\text{CONONS}_b\) if and only if \(Q= \text{SSNE}^{n-1}\). The axioms CONS, OPR, \(\text{PO}^{n-1}\) and \(\text{COCONS}_b\) are logically independent.











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