Any Inspection is Manipulable
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00244zbMATH Open1020.91046OpenAlexW2134442988MaRDI QIDQ4531035FDOQ4531035
Publication date: 28 May 2002
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00244
inspectorspanforecasterrealizationsBlackwell's approachability theoremsampling rulesaverage predictionchecking rulesforecasting schemegames with payoffs in infinite dimensional spacesmanipulative forecastmixed calibration testsprinciple of approachability
Inference from stochastic processes and prediction (62M20) Prediction theory (aspects of stochastic processes) (60G25) Proceedings, conferences, collections, etc. pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-06) Stochastic models in economics (91B70)
Cited In (20)
- Learning in Games
- On comparison of experts
- Calibration and Bayesian learning.
- On Sequences with Non-learnable Subsequences
- Belief-based equilibrium
- Mostly calibrated
- Merging and testing opinions
- Special issue: Learning in games: a symposium in honor of David Blackwell.
- On calibration error of randomized forecasting algorithms
- On universal algorithms for adaptive forecasting
- Good Randomized Sequential Probability Forecasting is Always Possible
- Transferable deposits as a screening mechanism
- Nonmanipulable Bayesian testing
- Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
- EFFICIENT TESTING OF FORECASTS
- A nonmanipulable test
- Approachability, regret and calibration: implications and equivalences
- A strategy-proof test of portfolio returns
- Testing theories with learnable and predictive representations
- Non-asymptotic calibration and resolution
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