Sequential bargaining, external effects of agreement, and public intervention

DOI10.1007/s00712-011-0220-1zbMath1247.91068OpenAlexW2035887235MaRDI QIDQ453460

Margrethe Aanesen

Publication date: 27 September 2012

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://hdl.handle.net/10037/4225

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium inefficiencydelays in tradeexternal effectspublic interventionsequential bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one- sided incomplete information
• Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture
• Transboundary air pollution, environmental aid, and political uncertainty
• A Multistage Model of Bargaining
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information
• Efficient Sequential Bargaining

This page was built for publication: Sequential bargaining, external effects of agreement, and public intervention