Fund tournaments and asset bubbles
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Publication:4555587
DOI10.1093/ROF/RFV044zbMATH Open1402.91730OpenAlexW2371322365MaRDI QIDQ4555587FDOQ4555587
Authors: Yuki Sato
Publication date: 20 November 2018
Published in: Review of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://serval.unil.ch/notice/serval:BIB_4710529E1D6D
Recommendations
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- Tournament-induced risk-shifting: a mean field games approach
Cited In (5)
- Testing for persistence in US mutual funds' performance: a Bayesian dynamic panel model
- The impact of a winner takes all tournament on managers' strategies and asset mispricing
- Performance-based fee contract and risk-taking strategy in asset management tournament
- Fund managers' competition for investment flows based on relative performance
- How tournament incentives affect asset markets: a comparison between winner-take-all tournaments and elimination contests
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