Cap-and-trade, taxes, and distributional conflict
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Recommendations
Cites work
- Citizen participation in pollution permit markets
- Estimates from a consumer demand system: implications for the incidence of environmental taxes
- Further results on permit markets with market power and cheating.
- Green taxes: refunding rules and lobbying
- Instrument choice for environmental protection when technological innovation is endogenous.
- Pollution taxes and revenue recycling
- Transitional politics: emerging incentive-based instruments in environmental regulation
Cited in
(8)- Rent dissipation in simple Tullock contests
- The feasibility of the double-dividend hypothesis in a democratic economy
- Environmental subsidy and the choice of green technology in the presence of green consumers
- Market-based approaches to environmental regulation.
- Competitive dominance of emission trading over Pigouvian taxation in a globalized economy
- Dynamic Competition under Cap and Trade Programs
- Cap-and-trade properties under different hybrid scheme designs
- Cap-and-trade under transactions costs and factor irreversibility
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