Cap-and-trade, taxes, and distributional conflict
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Publication:456415
DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2011.05.002zbMATH Open1250.91074OpenAlexW2092148228MaRDI QIDQ456415FDOQ456415
Authors: Ian A. MacKenzie, Markus Ohndorf
Publication date: 25 October 2012
Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2011.05.002
Recommendations
Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
Cites Work
- Transitional politics: emerging incentive-based instruments in environmental regulation
- Instrument choice for environmental protection when technological innovation is endogenous.
- Pollution taxes and revenue recycling
- Further results on permit markets with market power and cheating.
- Estimates from a consumer demand system: implications for the incidence of environmental taxes
- Citizen participation in pollution permit markets
- Green taxes: refunding rules and lobbying
Cited In (8)
- Environmental subsidy and the choice of green technology in the presence of green consumers
- Market-based approaches to environmental regulation.
- Competitive dominance of emission trading over Pigouvian taxation in a globalized economy
- Dynamic Competition under Cap and Trade Programs
- Cap-and-trade properties under different hybrid scheme designs
- Cap-and-trade under transactions costs and factor irreversibility
- Rent dissipation in simple Tullock contests
- The feasibility of the double-dividend hypothesis in a democratic economy
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