A note on quantum related-key attacks

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Publication:458382

DOI10.1016/J.IPL.2014.08.009zbMATH Open1358.94076arXiv1306.2301OpenAlexW2148184032MaRDI QIDQ458382FDOQ458382


Authors: Martin Roetteler, Rainer Steinwandt Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 7 October 2014

Published in: Information Processing Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: In a basic related-key attack against a block cipher, the adversary has access to encryptions under keys that differ from the target key by bit-flips. In this short note we show that for a quantum adversary such attacks are quite powerful: if the secret key is (i) uniquely determined by a small number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs, (ii) the block cipher can be evaluated efficiently, and (iii) a superposition of related keys can be queried, then the key can be extracted efficiently.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1306.2301




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