Social choice violations in rank sum scoring: a formalization of conditions and corrective probability computations

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2014.03.004MaRDI QIDQ459151zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Justin Ehrlich, Adam Winn, James Boudreau, Shane Sanders

Publication date 8 October 2014

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.03.004

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Parametric hypothesis testing (62F03) Statistical ranking and selection procedures (62F07) Nonparametric hypothesis testing (62G10) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• Borda and the maximum likelihood approach to vote aggregation
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3823440 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2038875 (Why is no real title available?)
• Mathematics and sports
• On a Test of Whether one of Two Random Variables is Stochastically Larger than the Other
• Social choice and individual values
• Social choice, optimal inference and figure skating

Cited in

(3)

• Cycles in team tennis and other paired-element contests
• Choosing ``flawed aggregation rules: the benefit of social choice violations in a league that values competitive balance
• Increasing the external validity of social preference games by reducing measurement error

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