Regulating food risk management—a government–manufacturer game facing endogenous consumer demand

DOI10.1111/ITOR.12269zbMATH Open1409.90098OpenAlexW2530128939MaRDI QIDQ4624902FDOQ4624902

Authors: Cen Song, Jun Zhuang 

Publication date: 20 February 2019

Published in: International Transactions in Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.12269

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zbMATH Keywords

game theoryrisk analysissupply chain managementproduction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cited In (4)

• Sales channel competition for supply chain with the blockchain technology
• Product safety assessment in a dairy dual-channel supply chain using game theory
• A tripartite evolutionary game model of ginger transaction under the ``regulation + target price insurance policy
• The supervision game of economically motivated adulteration behavior of fresh agricultural product suppliers

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