Regulating food risk management—a government–manufacturer game facing endogenous consumer demand

DOI10.1111/ITOR.12269MaRDI QIDQ4624902zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Cen Song, Jun Zhuang

Publication date 20 February 2019

Published in International Transactions in Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/itor.12269

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryrisk analysissupply chain managementproduction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cited in

(4)

• Product safety assessment in a dairy dual-channel supply chain using game theory
• The supervision game of economically motivated adulteration behavior of fresh agricultural product suppliers
• Sales channel competition for supply chain with the blockchain technology
• A tripartite evolutionary game model of ginger transaction under the ``regulation + target price insurance policy

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