Dynamic Models of Appraisal Networks Explaining Collective Learning

DOI10.1109/TAC.2017.2775963zbMath1425.91058arXiv1609.09546OpenAlexW2770807031MaRDI QIDQ4682349

Bullo, Francesco, Wenjun Mei, Noah E. Friedkin, Kyle M. Lewis

Publication date: 18 September 2018

Published in: IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1609.09546

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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