The core of the games with fractional linear utility functions

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Publication:4685237

zbMATH Open1413.90171arXiv1303.7041MaRDI QIDQ4685237FDOQ4685237


Authors: Monica Patriche Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 5 October 2018

Abstract: We consider fractional linear programming production games for the single-objective and multiobjective cases. We use the method of Chakraborty and Gupta (2002) in order to transform the fractional linear programming problems into linear programming problems. A cooperative game is attached and we prove the non-emptiness of the core by using the duality theory from the linear programming. In the multiobjective case, we give a characterization of the Stable outcome of the associate cooperative game, which is balanced. We also consider the cooperative game associated to an exchange economy with a finite number of agents.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1303.7041




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