scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3999623

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Publication:4726017





[For the entire collection see Zbl 0587.00029.] In a simple linear, continuous-time, dynamic macroeconomic model of the trade-off between unemployment and inflation, the authors formulate the policy conflict between the government and the central bank as a differential game with objective functions linear in the target variables (unemployment and inflation rates) and quadratic in the respective policy variables (growth rates of nominal money supply and real public expenditures) and solve for Nash noncooperative equilibrium) and Pareto optimal strategies. The particular formulation considered, however, leads to constant strategies independent of the current values of the state variables over the entire time horizon. The noncooperative solution is shown to be inefficient (not Pareto optimal) and the dependence of the optimal strategies on the parameters of the model is investigated through a sensitivity analysis.











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