scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4120145
[For the entire collection see Zbl 0674.00004.] Stephan Körner's logic of inexactness arose out of questions in epistemology and the philosophy of science; it applies to propositions concerning individuals which are not well distinguished from their backgrounds or other individuals, to classes and relations which admit of vagueness or borderline cases, and to cases where something may be continuous with respect to one criterion but discrete with respect to another. The logic is three-valued, allowing propositions to be neither true nor false, but neutral; it is defined by means of matrices corresponding to those given for other purposes by Kleene, Moisil, and others. This chapter deftly sketches the mathematical, rather than the philosophical, underpinnings of Körner's logic, bringing out especially its algebraic structure. The principal result here is that this three- valued logic and the corresponding calculus of inexact classes form a normal quasi-Boolean algebra, in much the way that classical two-valued logic and the calculus of (exact) classes constitute a Boolean algebra. There is also some discussion of Körner's ideas regarding relevance and entailment and the paradoxes of implication, and the relation of the Anderson-Belnap system of tautological entailment to quasi-Boolean algebras.
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