Oligopoly power producer's capacity investment model with contracts for differences

zbMATH Open1299.91050MaRDI QIDQ473941FDOQ473941

Authors: Xinhua Zhang, Hairong Huang, Xiaohua Xia 

Publication date: 24 November 2014

Published in: Mathematical Problems in Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cited In (2)

• An oligopolistic investment model of the Finnish electricity market
• Market power inhibiting effects of contracts for difference under Cournot game of electricity producers

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