Acceptance sampling in a producer—supplier conflicting environment: Risk neutral case

DOI10.1002/ASM.3150110103MaRDI QIDQ4842344zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Charles S. Tapiero

Publication date 3 October 1995

Published in Applied Stochastic Models and Data Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1002/asm.3150110103

zbMATH Keywords

acceptance samplingcost of informationinsurancemutual inspection gamerandom payoffs gamerisk neutrality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics in engineering and industry; control charts (62P30) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Recommendations

• The consumer's risk and costs in zero-acceptance number sampling
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3205044
• The incentive effect of acceptance sampling plans in a supply chain with endogenous product quality
• Acceptance sampling, imperfect production, and the optimality of zero defects
• Classical versus Bayesian risks in acceptance sampling: a sensitivity analysis

Cited in

(7)

• Contract design and the control of quality in a conflictual environment
• The consumer's risk and costs in zero-acceptance number sampling
• The incentive effect of acceptance sampling plans in a supply chain with endogenous product quality
• On the Evidence Needed to Reach Agreed Action Between Adversaries, with Application to Acceptance Sampling
• Yield and control in a supplier-customer relationship
• An Adversarial Risk Analysis Framework for Batch Acceptance Problems
• Consumers risk and quality control in a collaborative supply chain

This page was built for publication: Acceptance sampling in a producer—supplier conflicting environment: Risk neutral case

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4842344)