Information closure and the sceptical objection

DOI10.1007/s11229-013-0306-0zbMath1310.03025OpenAlexW2041307840WikidataQ56891024 ScholiaQ56891024MaRDI QIDQ484948

Luciano Floridi

Publication date: 8 January 2015

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://philpapers.org/rec/FLOICA

zbMATH Keywords

non-normal modal logicepistemic closureinformation closuremodal logic B (KTB)normal modal logicprinciple of information closuresceptical objection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Related Items (2)

Measure of information content of basic belief assignments ⋮ Safety, closure, and the flow of information

Cites Work

• Semantic information and the correctness theory of truth
• Information, possible worlds and the cooptation of scepticism
• The enduring scandal of deduction. Is propositional logic really uninformative?
• An epistemic logic for becoming informed
• Information and closure
• Information, closure, and knowledge: On Jäger's objection to Dretske
• Shutting Dretske's door
• Understanding epistemic relevance
• On the logical unsolvability of the Gettier problem
• Skepticism, information, and closure: Dretske's theory of knowledge.
• Towards closure on closure
• Philosophical Conceptions of Information
• Information Flow
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