Information closure and the sceptical objection
DOI10.1007/S11229-013-0306-0zbMATH Open1310.03025DBLPjournals/synthese/Floridi14OpenAlexW2041307840WikidataQ56891024 ScholiaQ56891024MaRDI QIDQ484948FDOQ484948
Authors: Luciano Floridi 
Publication date: 8 January 2015
Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://philpapers.org/rec/FLOICA
Recommendations
non-normal modal logicepistemic closureinformation closuremodal logic B (KTB)normal modal logicprinciple of information closuresceptical objection
Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45)
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- Information, closure, and knowledge: On Jäger's objection to Dretske
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- Understanding epistemic relevance
Cited In (4)
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