Wright on the Non-mechanizability of Intuitionist Reasoning

DOI10.1093/PHILMAT/3.1.103MaRDI QIDQ4859239zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michael Detlefsen

Publication date 22 July 1996

Published in Philosophia Mathematica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/3.1.103

zbMATH Keywords

philosophy of mindGödel's incompleteness theoremsmechanisation of thinking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Philosophy of mathematics (00A30)

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• Reasoning without believing: on the mechanisation of presuppositions and partiality
• Truth and proof in intuitionism
• Methods and Applications of Artificial Intelligence
• Dummett's case for intuitionism

Cited in

(1)

• Knowledge, machines, and the consistency of Reinhardt's strong mechanistic thesis

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