Optimal Contracts for Teams: A Note on the Results of McAfee and McMillan

DOI10.2307/2527272MaRDI QIDQ4883153zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thomas D. vander Veen

Publication date 13 October 1996

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2527272

zbMATH Keywords

monitoringteamoptimal contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

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Cited in

(3)

• Dynamic production teams with strategic behavior
• Dominance of contributions monitoring in teams
• Optimal Contracts for Teams

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