scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1415127
Aristotlesars conjectandiBayesian statisticsfalsificationismhypothetico-deductive methodinduction probleminductive inferenceinductive syllogisminverse probabilityJakob Bernoullilaw of large numbersmathematical inverse probabilitymethodology of scienceMiddle AgesNewtonprobability theoryRenaissanceThomas Bayes
The author argues for a revolution in the methodology of science, released by \textit{K. Popper}'s ``Logik der Forschung zur Erkenntnistheorie der modernen Naturwissenschaft [Wien, Springer (1935; Zbl 0010.24202)], because it had reversed a valid frame and installed a new one instead. ``Nobody, the author claims, ``could seriously maintain any longer that induction is the key for scientific progress (p.\ 305). The author starts with a glance at induction in history starting with \textit{Aristotles} rather unsystematic hints and their effect on the philosophy of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance up to \textit{Newton}. He then discusses \textit{Hume}'s arguments against the certainty of inductive inferences, the probability theory of \textit{Jakob Bernoulli} and \textit{Thomas Bayes}' work on mathematical inverse probability which gave a widely accepted solution to the induction problem. The author finally presents Popper's falsificationism as the revolutionary step, ignoring, however, that \textit{Rudolf Carnap} and \textit{Hans Reichenbach}, e.g., never became Popperians, but continued to be influential in the philosophy of science. It should furthermore be noted that Popper's normative methodology of science itself became a victim of the ``anti-positivistic turn in the philosophy of science released by \textit{Thomas S. Kuhn}'s idea of scientific revolutions. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0932.00037].
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