scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1444714

Publication date 22 March 2001

action logic compound actions deontic logic logic of norms

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

This paper presents a very thorough, clear and precise exposition of a logic of action that provides a distributive foundation for a logic of norms or deontic logic. In contrast to more familiar approaches to deontic logic, i.e., as a type of modal logic, this account regards permission, prohibition and obligation as predicates of actions. These are defined first for atomic actions, then for compound actions. Atomic actions themselves are constructed as binary relations, e.g., transitions, on states of a system; compound actions are sets of finite sequences of atomic actions. In Section 1, the theory of atomic actions is made precise, including a sense of allowable and unallowable actions. Section 2 adds to that the theory of atomic norms, construed as structures \((\Phi, A,\nu)\), where \(\Phi\) is an elementary proposition describing the condition of the system, \(A\) an atomic action, and \(\nu\) either \(+\), \(-\), or !, for values of permissibility, impermissibility and obligation. To each atomic norm \((\Phi, A,+)\) there corresponds an elementary normative proposition \(\Phi\to {\mathbf P}A\), saying that if the system is in condition \(\Phi\) then action \(A\) is permitted (and similarly for prohibition and obligation). This is the `proposition expressed by the norm' or the `meaning of the norm'. Section 3 develops these ideas formally and defines the semantics for the language of norms and their propositions. Sections 4 and 5 present the full logic of (atomic) norms, leading to a completeness theorem, proved by standard Henkin-style means. The logic, \(\text{DL}^+\), is very weak, having only the two axioms \({\mathbf O}A\to{\mathbf P}A\) and \({\mathbf P}A\to \neg{\mathbf F}A\). Sections 6 and 7 extend the program to the logic of compound actions and norms and their propositions. Here we have the semantical theory, but no axiomatization. Section 8 examines the question of whether a system of norms uniquely determines the set of allowable (unallowable) actions. Section 9 concludes by bringing into the account dynamic restrictions that may be placed on norms due to changes in the situation of the system, e.g., background conditions, sequencing of actions, etc. In all parts of the discussion the relevant concepts are rigorously defined and their consequences meticulously drawn. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0931.00028].

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