False‐Name Manipulation in Weighted Voting Games: Empirical and Theoretical Analysis

DOI10.1111/coin.12096zbMath1427.91121OpenAlexW2473314794MaRDI QIDQ4973835

Ramoni O. Lasisi, Vicki H. Allan

Publication date: 6 December 2019

Published in: Computational Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/coin.12096

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionweighted voting gamesagentspower indicesShapley-Shubik indexBanzhaf indexfalse-name manipulations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)

Related Items (1)

Worst-case Bounds on Power vs. Proportion in Weighted Voting Games with an Application to False-name Manipulation

This page was built for publication: False‐Name Manipulation in Weighted Voting Games: Empirical and Theoretical Analysis