Moral hazard: experimental evidence from tenancy contracts
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Recommendations
- Moral Hazard, Financial Constraints and Sharecropping in El Oulja
- Land Tenancy and Non-Contractible Investment in Rural Pakistan
- Hidden action and outcome contractibility: an experimental test of moral hazard theory
- A Leibenstein–Hobbes–Walras Model of Sharecropping
- The equilibrium impact of agricultural risk on intermediate inputs and aggregate productivity
Cited in
(12)- An experimental investigation of the incentives to form agricultural marketing pools
- Land Tenancy and Non-Contractible Investment in Rural Pakistan
- A Leibenstein–Hobbes–Walras Model of Sharecropping
- Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: a laboratory experiment
- Property rights, land misallocation, and agricultural efficiency in China
- The equilibrium impact of agricultural risk on intermediate inputs and aggregate productivity
- A DYNAMICAL ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF AGRICULTURAL LAND TENURE
- Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts
- Regression-adjusted estimation of quantile treatment effects under covariate-adaptive randomizations
- Valuing the time of the self-employed
- Testing heterogeneous treatment effect with quantile regression under covariate-adaptive randomization
- Adjustments with many regressors under covariate-adaptive randomizations
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