Synthesis of Supervisors Robust Against Sensor Deception Attacks
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Publication:5036261
DOI10.1109/TAC.2021.3051459MaRDI QIDQ5036261FDOQ5036261
Authors: Rômulo Meira-Góes, Stéphane Lafortune, H. Marchand
Publication date: 23 February 2022
Published in: IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2012.12932
Cited In (10)
- On decidability of existence of nonblocking supervisors resilient to smart sensor attacks
- Dealing with sensor and actuator deception attacks in supervisory control
- Synthesis of winning attacks on communication protocols using supervisory control theory: two case studies
- Approximate current state observability of discrete-time nonlinear systems under cyber-attacks
- Discrete-event systems subject to unknown sensor attacks
- Persuasion-Based Robust Sensor Design Against Attackers With Unknown Control Objectives
- On tolerance of discrete systems with respect to transition perturbations
- Safe environmental envelopes of discrete systems
- Sensor deception attacks against security in supervisory control systems
- Synthesis of covert actuator and sensor attackers
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