On decidability of existence of nonblocking supervisors resilient to smart sensor attacks
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Publication:6175603
Abstract: Cybersecurity of discrete event systems (DES) has been gaining more and more attention recently, due to its high relevance to the so-called 4th industrial revolution that heavily relies on data communication among networked systems. One key challenge is how to ensure system resilience to sensor and/or actuator attacks, which may tamper data integrity and service availability. In this paper we focus on some key decidability issues related to smart sensor attacks. We first present a sufficient and necessary condition that ensures the existence of a smart sensor attack, which reveals a novel demand-supply relationship between an attacker and a controlled plant, represented as a set of risky pairs. Each risky pair consists of a damage string desired by the attacker and an observable sequence feasible in the supervisor such that the latter induces a sequence of control patterns, which allows the damage string to happen. It turns out that each risky pair can induce a smart weak sensor attack. Next, we show that, when the plant, supervisor and damage language are regular, it is computationally feasible to remove all such risky pairs from the plant behaviour, via a genuine encoding scheme, upon which we are able to establish our key result that the existence of a nonblocking supervisor resilient to smart sensor attacks is decidable. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result of its kind in the DES literature on cyber attacks. The proposed decision process renders a specific synthesis procedure that guarantees to compute a resilient supervisor whenever it exists, which so far has not been achieved in the literature.
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Cited in
(4)- Supervisory control of discrete-event systems under external attacks
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- Robust corrective control against fundamental and non-fundamental mode attacks with application to an asynchronous digital system
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