The Savage principle and accounting for outcome in single-criterion nonlinear problem under uncertainty
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Publication:5040968
DOI10.35634/2226-3594-2022-59-03zbMATH Open1496.90109OpenAlexW4283124042MaRDI QIDQ5040968FDOQ5040968
Authors: L. V. Zhukovskaya, S. P. Samsonov, Lidiya Viktorovna Smirnova, Vladislav I. Zhukovskiĭ
Publication date: 18 October 2022
Published in: Izvestiya Instituta Matematiki i Informatiki Udmurtskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://mathnet.ru/eng/iimi426
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