Existence of Berge equilibrium in conflicts under uncertainty
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Recommendations
- Equilibrating of conflicts under uncertainty. II: Analogue of a maximin
- Equilibrating of conflicts under uncertainty. I: Analogue of a saddle-point
- Existence of strong Berge equilibrium under uncertainty
- The bargaining problem with an uncertain conflict outcome
- A complicated notion of equilibrium for conflict problems
- A criterion for the strong stability of conflict equilibria
- A criterion for the strong stability of conflict equilibria
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 770203
- Existence of strong Berge equilibrium for generalized non-cooperative games under uncertainty
- Extending the theory of conflict equilibria
Cites work
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- A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points
- A note on Berge equilibrium
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
- Mutual support in games: some properties of Berge equilibria
- Non-cooperative games
- The vector-valued maximin
Cited in
(4)- Mathematical foundations of the golden rule. I: Static variant
- A note on Berge equilibrium
- The Savage principle and accounting for outcome in single-criterion nonlinear problem under uncertainty
- A solution guaranteed for a risk-neutral person to a one-criterion problem: an analog of the vector saddle point
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