Measuring ex ante welfare in insurance markets

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAA015MaRDI QIDQ5049094zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nathaniel Hendren

Publication date 11 November 2022

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa015

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectioninsurancewelfare

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Actuarial mathematics (91G05) Welfare economics (91B15)

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• Optimal redistribution with a shadow economy
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