On optimal partitions, individual values and cooperative games: does a wiser agent always produce a higher value?

DOI10.1007/S11579-016-0172-XMaRDI QIDQ506382zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Publication date 31 January 2017

Published in Mathematics and Financial Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1506.01242

cooperative games Kantorovich Monge optimal mass transport

Variational problems in a geometric measure-theoretic setting (49Q20) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Cooperative games (91A12)

Abstract: We consider an optimal partition of resources (e.g. consumers) between several agents (e.g. experts), given utility functions ("wisdoms") for the agents and their capacities. This problem is a variant of optimal transport (Monge-Kantorovich) between two measure spaces where one of the measures is discrete (capacities) and the costs of transport are the wisdoms of the agents. We concentrate on the individual value for each agent under optimal partition and show that, counter-intuitively, this value may decrease if the agent's wisdom is increased. Sufficient and necessary conditions for increment of the individual values will be given, independently of the other agents. The sharpness of these conditions is also discussed. Motivated by the above we define a cooperative game based on optimal partition and investigate conditions for the existence of a core for this game, guaranteeing the stability of the grand coalition.

Recommendations

Cites work

Cited in

(1)

Optimal monopoly pricing with congestion and random utility via partial mass transport

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

EMD

This page was built for publication: On optimal partitions, individual values and cooperative games: does a wiser agent always produce a higher value?

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q506382)