Involuntary unemployment as a Nash equilibrium and fiscal policy for full employment

DOI10.1142/S0219198921500183MaRDI QIDQ5094547zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yasuhito Tanaka

Publication date 3 August 2022

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198921500183

zbMATH Keywords

overlapping generations modelfiscal policyinvoluntary unemploymentgame theoretic analysis

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Applications of game theory (91A80) Labor markets (91B39)

Recommendations

• A new model of equilibrium involutary unemployment
• A welfare economics foundation for the full-employment policy
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• The Role of Fiscal Policy in an Incomplete Markets Framework
• Optimal Unemployment Insurance Policy

Cites work

• A welfare economics foundation for the full-employment policy
• Keynesian economics and price theory. Re-orientation of a theory of monetary economy
• The dynamically extended Keynesian cross and the welfare-improving fiscal policy
• The fair wage-effort hypothesis and unemployment

Cited in

(2)

• A welfare economics foundation for the full-employment policy
• Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

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