Optimal bank regulation and fiscal capacity
DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDZ012zbMATH Open1437.91447OpenAlexW2308093666WikidataQ128301784 ScholiaQ128301784MaRDI QIDQ5110014FDOQ5110014
Authors: Vania Stavrakeva 
Publication date: 14 May 2020
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://lbsresearch.london.edu/id/eprint/1117/1/Stavrakeva_2018_Final.pdf
Recommendations
- Optimal design of bank regulation under aggregate risk
- Allocating losses: bail-ins, bailouts and bank regulation
- State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics
- Capital regulation, bank competition, and financial stability
- Financial Regulation in a Quantitative Model of the Modern Banking System
moral hazardfiscal capacitypecuniary externalitiesderivatives regulation``too-big-to-failoptimal bank regulation
Derivative securities (option pricing, hedging, etc.) (91G20) Financial networks (including contagion, systemic risk, regulation) (91G45)
Cited In (9)
- Unbounded liabilities, capital reserve requirements and the taxpayer put option
- Allocating losses: bail-ins, bailouts and bank regulation
- Let the Worst One Fail: A Credible Solution to the Too-Big-To-Fail Conundrum
- Optimal bailouts, bank's incentive and risk
- State-contingent bank regulation with unobserved actions and unobserved characteristics
- Financial Regulation in a Quantitative Model of the Modern Banking System
- An Excursion-Theoretic Approach to Regulator’s Bank Reorganization Problem
- Bank capital regulation with random audits.
- Optimal design of bank regulation under aggregate risk
This page was built for publication: Optimal bank regulation and fiscal capacity
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5110014)
