Dynamic scale return coefficient with environmental feedback promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game
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Cites work
- An improved public goods game model with reputation effect on the spatial lattices
- Collective dynamics of `small-world' networks
- Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game
- Continuous spatial public goods game with self and peer punishment based on particle swarm optimization
- Evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game with adaptive reputation assortment
- Evolutionary game theory: theoretical concepts and applications to microbial communities
- Impact of individual response strategy on the spatial public goods game within mobile agents
- Individual behavior and social wealth in the spatial public goods game
- Inferring the reputation enhances the cooperation in the public goods game on interdependent lattices
- Promoting cooperation by reputation-driven group formation
- Promotion of cooperation induced by nonuniform payoff allocation in spatial public goods game
- Replicator dynamics of reward \& reputation in public goods games
- Reputation-based investment strategy promotes cooperation in public goods games
- Reputation-based mutual selection rule promotes cooperation in spatial threshold public goods games
- Spontaneous punishment promotes cooperation in public good game
- Stochastic dynamics and stable equilibrium of evolutionary optional public goods game in finite populations
- Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas
- The effect of increasing returns to scale in public goods investment on threshold values of cooperation under social exclusion mechanism
- The evolutionary public goods game model with punishment mechanism in an activity-driven network
- The influence of age-driven investment on cooperation in spatial public goods games
Cited in
(14)- Evidential reasoning based on imitation and aspiration information in strategy learning promotes cooperation in optional spatial public goods game
- Evolutionary dynamics in spatial threshold public goods game with the asymmetric return rate mechanism
- Environmental feedback in spatial public goods game
- The effect of increasing returns to scale in public goods investment on threshold values of cooperation under social exclusion mechanism
- Effect of reputation-based heterogeneous investment on cooperation in spatial public goods game
- Heterogeneous investment with dynamical feedback promotes public cooperation and group success in spatial public goods games
- Environmental feedback and cooperation in climate change dilemma
- Social exclusion with dynamic cost on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games
- Promoting cooperation by reputation scoring mechanism based on historical donations in public goods game
- How to evaluate one's behavior toward ``bad individuals? Exploring good social norms in promoting cooperation in spatial public goods games
- Reputation preferences resolve social dilemmas in spatial multigames
- Evolution of cooperation with nonlinear environment feedback in repeated public goods game
- Reputation-dependent social learning on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games
- Environmental information perception enhances cooperation in stochastic public goods games via Q-learning
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