The supermarket game

From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:5168871)



Abstract: A supermarket game is considered with N FCFS queues with unit exponential service rate and global Poisson arrival rate Nlambda. Upon arrival each customer chooses a number of queues to be sampled uniformly at random and joins the least loaded sampled queue. Customers are assumed to have cost for both waiting and sampling, and they want to minimize their own expected total cost. We study the supermarket game in a mean field model that corresponds to the limit as N converges to infinity in the sense that (i) for a fixed symmetric customer strategy, the joint equilibrium distribution of any fixed number of queues converges as Noinfty to a product distribution determined by the mean field model and (ii) a Nash equilibrium for the mean field model is an epsilon-Nash equilibrium for the finite N model with N sufficiently large. It is shown that there always exists a Nash equilibrium for lambda<1 and the Nash equilibrium is unique with homogeneous waiting cost for lambda2le1/2. Furthermore, we find that the action of sampling more queues by some customers has a positive externality on the other customers in the mean field model, but can have a negative externality for finite N.












This page was built for publication: The supermarket game

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5168871)