Nash and social welfare impact in an international trade model
DOI10.3934/JDG.2017009zbMATH Open1391.91122OpenAlexW2596835947MaRDI QIDQ520969FDOQ520969
Authors: Alberto Pinto, Filipe Martins, J. P. Zubelli 
Publication date: 6 April 2017
Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2017009
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Nash equilibriumprisoner's dilemmainternational tradewelfaresocial optimuminternational duopolytariffs game
Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Trade models (91B60)
Cites Work
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- Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly
- Unknown costs in a duopoly with differentiated products
- Bayesian price leadership
- An economical model for dumping by dumping in a Cournot model
- A repeated strategy for dumping
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Cited In (5)
- Nash equilibrium in tariffs in a multi-country trade model
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A comparison of game-theoretic models for parallel trade
- On the game mechanism and welfare efficiency of the trade competition under correlated market
- Uniqueness and comparative statics of Nash equilibrium in a tariff retaliation model
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