INSURANCE‐INDUCED MORAL HAZARD: A DYNAMIC MODEL OF WITHIN‐YEAR MEDICAL CARE DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY

DOI10.1111/IERE.12349zbMath1422.91336OpenAlexW2156423630WikidataQ129348152 ScholiaQ129348152MaRDI QIDQ5224958

Christopher J. Cronin

Publication date: 25 July 2019

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12349

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardhealth insurancemedical care consumption

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (1)

Disentangling moral hazard and adverse selection in private health insurance

Cites Work

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