Salience, myopia, and complex dynamic incentives: evidence from Medicare Part D

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDZ023zbMATH Open1437.91390OpenAlexW3023080731MaRDI QIDQ5110005FDOQ5110005

Robert J. Town, Gautam Gowrisankaran, Christina M. Dalton

Publication date: 14 May 2020

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz023

Recommendations

• The welfare impact of reducing choice in Medicare Part D: a comparison of two regulation strategies
• Evaluating consumers' choices of Medicare Part D plans: a study in behavioral welfare economics
• Externalities and benefit design in health insurance
• Adverse selection, moral hazard and the demand for Medigap insurance
• Behavioral hazard in health insurance

zbMATH Keywords

discontinuitycost sharingdoughnut holenonlinear prices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Actuarial mathematics (91G05)

Cited In (2)

• Time-consistent equilibria in dynamic models with recursive payoffs and behavioral discounting
• INSURANCE‐INDUCED MORAL HAZARD: A DYNAMIC MODEL OF WITHIN‐YEAR MEDICAL CARE DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY

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