Externalities and benefit design in health insurance

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDZ052zbMATH Open1475.91316OpenAlexW3121173742MaRDI QIDQ3382425FDOQ3382425

Authors: Amanda Starc, Robert J. Town 

Publication date: 21 September 2021

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz052

Recommendations

• Behavioral hazard in health insurance
• Health insurance, market power, and social welfare
• Analysing the Effects of Insuring Health Risks: On the Trade-off between Short-Run Insurance Benefits versus Long-Run Incentive Costs
• Adverse selection, moral hazard and the demand for Medigap insurance
• Equilibria in health exchanges: adverse selection versus reclassification risk

zbMATH Keywords

analysis of health care markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Actuarial mathematics (91G05)

Cited In (3)

• Winners and losers of universal health insurance: a macroeconomic analysis
• Salience, myopia, and complex dynamic incentives: evidence from Medicare Part D
• Analysing the Effects of Insuring Health Risks: On the Trade-off between Short-Run Insurance Benefits versus Long-Run Incentive Costs

This page was built for publication: Externalities and benefit design in health insurance

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3382425)