Externalities and benefit design in health insurance

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDZ052MaRDI QIDQ3382425zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Amanda Starc, Robert J. Town

Publication date 21 September 2021

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz052

zbMATH Keywords

analysis of health care markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Actuarial mathematics (91G05)

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(3)

• Analysing the Effects of Insuring Health Risks: On the Trade-off between Short-Run Insurance Benefits versus Long-Run Incentive Costs
• Winners and losers of universal health insurance: a macroeconomic analysis
• Salience, myopia, and complex dynamic incentives: evidence from Medicare Part D

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