Adverse selection, moral hazard and the demand for Medigap insurance
From MaRDI portal
Publication:894637
Recommendations
- Disentangling moral hazard and adverse selection in private health insurance
- Insurance-Induced moral hazard: a dynamic model of within-year medical care decision making under uncertainty
- Adverse selection, moral hazard and propitious selection
- Equilibria in health exchanges: adverse selection versus reclassification risk
- Claim timing and \textit{ex post} adverse selection
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3062534 (Why is no real title available?)
- A model of health plan choice: inferring preferences and perceptions from a combination of revealed preference and attitudinal data.
- Bayes inference in the Tobit censored regression model
- Bayesian analysis of the ordered probit model with endogenous selection
- Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data.
- Imputing risk tolerance from survey responses
- Smoothly mixing regressions
Cited in
(11)- Is there adverse selection in the U.S. social security system?
- Adverse selection, moral hazard and propitious selection
- Replacement cost endorsement and opportunistic fraud in automobile insurance
- Health insurance risk assessment using cognitive mapping and multiple‐criteria decision analysis
- Disentangling moral hazard and adverse selection in private health insurance
- Externalities and benefit design in health insurance
- Insurance-Induced moral hazard: a dynamic model of within-year medical care decision making under uncertainty
- Behavioral hazard in health insurance
- Salience, myopia, and complex dynamic incentives: evidence from Medicare Part D
- Health insurance reform: the impact of a medicare buy-in
- Claim timing and \textit{ex post} adverse selection
This page was built for publication: Adverse selection, moral hazard and the demand for Medigap insurance
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q894637)
