Adverse selection, moral hazard and the demand for Medigap insurance
DOI10.1016/J.JECONOM.2015.08.002zbMATH Open1422.91358OpenAlexW2103655775WikidataQ60155190 ScholiaQ60155190MaRDI QIDQ894637FDOQ894637
Authors: Olena Stavrunova, Michael Keane 
Publication date: 2 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2015.08.002
Recommendations
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- Adverse selection, moral hazard and propitious selection
- Equilibria in health exchanges: adverse selection versus reclassification risk
- Claim timing and \textit{ex post} adverse selection
Markov chain Monte CarloBayesian analysismissing datadata fusionhealth insuranceadverse selectionmoral hazardsimultaneous equation modelMedicareGibbshealth expendituresMedigapMetropolis
Cites Work
- Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data.
- Smoothly mixing regressions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Bayes inference in the Tobit censored regression model
- Bayesian analysis of the ordered probit model with endogenous selection
- A model of health plan choice: inferring preferences and perceptions from a combination of revealed preference and attitudinal data.
- Imputing risk tolerance from survey responses
Cited In (4)
- Replacement cost endorsement and opportunistic fraud in automobile insurance
- Health insurance risk assessment using cognitive mapping and multiple‐criteria decision analysis
- Disentangling moral hazard and adverse selection in private health insurance
- Adverse selection, moral hazard and propitious selection
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