Adverse selection, moral hazard and the demand for Medigap insurance

DOI10.1016/j.jeconom.2015.08.002zbMath1422.91358OpenAlexW2103655775WikidataQ60155190 ScholiaQ60155190MaRDI QIDQ894637

Olena Stavrunova, Michael P. Keane

Publication date: 2 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2015.08.002

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian analysisMarkov chain Monte Carlomissing datamoral hazardadverse selectiondata fusionhealth insuranceGibbssimultaneous equation modelMedicarehealth expendituresMedigapMetropolis

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (2)

Disentangling moral hazard and adverse selection in private health insurance ⋮ Health insurance risk assessment using cognitive mapping and multiple‐criteria decision analysis

Uses Software

• BayesDA

Cites Work

• Smoothly mixing regressions
• Bayesian analysis of the ordered probit model with endogenous selection
• Bayes inference in the Tobit censored regression model
• A model of health plan choice: inferring preferences and perceptions from a combination of revealed preference and attitudinal data.
• Imputing Risk Tolerance From Survey Responses
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

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