Dynamic models of private and public interests combining in promoting innovations

MaRDI QIDQ5229997zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Anatoliĭ B. Usov, Gennadiĭ A. Ugol'nitskiĭ

Publication date 19 August 2019

Full work available at URL http://mathnet.ru/eng/mgta232

zbMATH Keywords

simulationNash equilibriumStackelberg equilibriumGermeier gamesmethod of qualitatively representative strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1734466 (Why is no real title available?)
• Dynamic hierarchical two-person games in programming strategies and their applications

Cited in

(6)

• Hierarchical games with additive payoff functions combining public and private interests
• Difference Stackelberg game theoretic model of innovations in universities as Cournot oligopoly
• An analog of Bondareva-Shapley theorem. II: Examples of V-balanced fuzzy games
• Public Interest and Private Enterprize: New Developments
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7038029 (Why is no real title available?)
• Public support to innovation and imitation in a non-scale growth model

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