Dynamic models for coordinating private and public interests in economic corruption

DOI10.1134/S1064230720010128zbMATH Open1448.91204OpenAlexW3015116560MaRDI QIDQ786117FDOQ786117

Authors: Anatoliĭ B. Usov, Gennadiĭ A. Ugol'nitskiĭ 

Publication date: 12 August 2020

Published in: Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1134/s1064230720010128

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zbMATH Keywords

corruptiondynamic game-theoretic modelsprivate and public interest coordination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Mathematical economics (91B99) Dynamic games (91A25) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

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• On the stability and potential cyclicity of corruption in governments subject to popularity constraints
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• Mean-field-game model of corruption
• Models of state inspections organizations and struggle against corruptions
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• Leading bureaucracies to the tipping point: an alternative model of multiple stable equilibrium levels of corruption
• The dynamic hierarchical games of two players in programming strategies and their exhibits
• Dynamic models of struggle against corruption in hierarchical management systems of exploitation of biological resources

Cited In (24)

• Corruption mechanisms in models of social and private interests combining engine in the case of one agent. Optimization approach
• Hierarchical Model of Corruption: Game-Theoretic Approach
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A public contracting evolutionary game with corruption
• Fighting corruption: to precommit or not?
• Hierarchical games with additive payoff functions combining public and private interests
• On the impact of corruption on managers' and controllers' behavior
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Mathematical modeling, analysis, and optimal control of corruption dynamics
• Mechanisms of struggle with corruption in dynamic social and private interests coordination engine models
• Simulation modeling of the resource allocation under economic corruption
• Mathematical modeling on transmission and optimal control strategies of corruption dynamics
• Models of optimal organization of the tax inspection
• Struggle against the corruption cartel
• Dynamic models of private and public interests combining in promoting innovations
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Dynamic models of struggle against corruption in hierarchical management systems of exploitation of biological resources
• On smart sanctions
• Should civil society organizations cooperate or compete in fighting a corrupt government?
• Dynamic models of corruption in hierarchical control systems
• Mean-field-game model of corruption
• Political corruption and public activism: an evolutionary game-theoretic analysis
• Event corruption: a game theoretic approach
• Sustainability of intertwined supply networks: a game-theoretic approach

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