Dynamic models for coordinating private and public interests in economic corruption
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Cited in
(24)- Political corruption and public activism: an evolutionary game-theoretic analysis
- Dynamic models of private and public interests combining in promoting innovations
- Dynamic models of struggle against corruption in hierarchical management systems of exploitation of biological resources
- Event corruption: a game theoretic approach
- Hierarchical Model of Corruption: Game-Theoretic Approach
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2000127 (Why is no real title available?)
- Simulation modeling of the resource allocation under economic corruption
- Dynamic models of corruption in hierarchical control systems
- Models of optimal organization of the tax inspection
- A public contracting evolutionary game with corruption
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6755941 (Why is no real title available?)
- Mathematical modeling on transmission and optimal control strategies of corruption dynamics
- Struggle against the corruption cartel
- Fighting corruption: to precommit or not?
- Hierarchical games with additive payoff functions combining public and private interests
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- Mathematical modeling, analysis, and optimal control of corruption dynamics
- Corruption mechanisms in models of social and private interests combining engine in the case of one agent. Optimization approach
- On smart sanctions
- Should civil society organizations cooperate or compete in fighting a corrupt government?
- Mean-field-game model of corruption
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1842058 (Why is no real title available?)
- Mechanisms of struggle with corruption in dynamic social and private interests coordination engine models
- Sustainability of intertwined supply networks: a game-theoretic approach
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