Does the Interventionist Notion of Causation Deliver Us from the Fear of Epiphenomenalism?

DOI10.1080/02698595.2013.813254zbMATH Open1311.03027OpenAlexW2066142511MaRDI QIDQ5250256FDOQ5250256

Authors: Tuomas K. Pernu 

Publication date: 19 May 2015

Published in: International Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2013.813254

Recommendations

• Intervention, determinism, and the causal minimality condition
• The interventionist account of causation and non-causal association laws
• Causal counterfactuals are not interventionist counterfactuals
• Causation: Objective or Subjective?
• Mental causation and nonreductive physicalism, an unhappy marriage?
• Epistemology versus non-causal realism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)

Cites Work

• Independence, Invariance and the Causal Markov Condition

Cited In (5)

• Mental causation and nonreductive physicalism, an unhappy marriage?
• Building low level causation out of high level causation
• Causal exclusion and downward counterfactuals
• The interventionist account of causation and non-causal association laws
• Why there isn't inter-level causation in mechanisms

This page was built for publication: Does the Interventionist Notion of Causation Deliver Us from the Fear of Epiphenomenalism?

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5250256)