Does the Interventionist Notion of Causation Deliver Us from the Fear of Epiphenomenalism?

DOI10.1080/02698595.2013.813254MaRDI QIDQ5250256zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tuomas K. Pernu

Publication date 19 May 2015

Published in International Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2013.813254

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)

Recommendations

• Intervention, determinism, and the causal minimality condition
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• Epistemology versus non-causal realism

Cites work

• Independence, Invariance and the Causal Markov Condition

Cited in

(5)

• Mental causation and nonreductive physicalism, an unhappy marriage?
• Building low level causation out of high level causation
• Causal exclusion and downward counterfactuals
• The interventionist account of causation and non-causal association laws
• Why there isn't inter-level causation in mechanisms

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