Epistemology versus non-causal realism
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1708792
DOI10.1007/S11229-015-1010-ZzbMATH Open1382.03035OpenAlexW2288160302MaRDI QIDQ1708792FDOQ1708792
Authors: Jared Warren
Publication date: 27 March 2018
Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-1010-z
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Counterfactuals.
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Radical interpretation
- Doubt truth to be a liar
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A Platonist epistemology.
- Conventionalism, consistency, and consistency sentences
- What is absolute undecidability?
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (5)
- Realism, reliability, and epistemic possibility: on modally interpreting the Benacerraf-Field challenge
- Counterpossibles for modal normativists
- On Field's epistemological argument against Platonism
- Does the Interventionist Notion of Causation Deliver Us from the Fear of Epiphenomenalism?
- A metasemantic challenge for mathematical determinacy
This page was built for publication: Epistemology versus non-causal realism
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1708792)