Realism, reliability, and epistemic possibility: on modally interpreting the Benacerraf-Field challenge

DOI10.1007/S11229-020-02984-7MaRDI QIDQ6142497zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Brett Topey

Publication date 26 January 2024

Published in Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02984-7

zbMATH Keywords

counterpossiblesmodal epistemologyPlatonismreliability challenge

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Recommendations

• The reality of Field's epistemological challenge to Platonism
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1090730
• Benacerraf, Field, and the agreement of mathematicians
• Epistemology versus non-causal realism
• The defeater version of Benacerraf's problem for a priori knowledge

Cites work

• Counterpossibles
• Epistemology versus non-causal realism
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6514776 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 51351 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1254479 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2168553 (Why is no real title available?)
• Impossible worlds: A modest approach
• Mathematics, Morality, and Self‐Effacement
• Modal objectivity
• Remarks on counterpossibles
• Williamson on counterpossibles

Cited in

(1)

• Numbers as properties

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