scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1254479
The paper focuses on objections to Platonism. Particularly those identified with an epistemological character. Indeed, there is a feeling that the Platonist conception of mathematics effectively precludes any credible, nonmystifying account of the knowledge of mathematical truths. The thesis of the author is that there is no special epistemological problem confronting a Platonist construal of pure mathematical statements. In other terms, that, given a satisfactory epistemology of necessary truth in general, there is no additional problem for Platonism. He assumes that there are necessary truths and that such truths can be known. The key issue is whether mathematical truths are among them. The paper is largely devoted to discuss Hartry Field's seminal essay on realism, mathematics and modality [in: Realism, mathematics and modality (Blackwell, Oxford) (1989)]. The author builds up the response to his main question with a discussion of mathematical truth. Then he proceeds to discuss beliefs about consistency and about logical consequence, followed by a long section on contingency and necessity. He concludes that the existential commitments of mathematical statements, Platonistically construed, pose no insuperable obstacle to their being necessarily true. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0897.00021].
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