A state-constrained differential game arising in optimal portfolio liquidation

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Publication:5283403

DOI10.1111/MAFI.12108zbMATH Open1397.91561arXiv1312.7360OpenAlexW2154016330MaRDI QIDQ5283403FDOQ5283403


Authors: Alexander Schied, Tao Zhang Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 21 July 2017

Published in: Mathematical Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We consider n risk-averse agents who compete for liquidity in an Almgren--Chriss market impact model. Mathematically, this situation can be described by a Nash equilibrium for a certain linear-quadratic differential game with state constraints. The state constraints enter the problem as terminal boundary conditions for finite and infinite time horizons. We prove existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria and give closed-form solutions in some special cases. We also analyze qualitative properties of the equilibrium strategies and provide corresponding financial interpretations.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1312.7360




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