Too good to be true: when overwhelming evidence fails to convince

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Publication:5363533

DOI10.1098/RSPA.2015.0748zbMATH Open1373.62026arXiv1601.00900OpenAlexW2232134439WikidataQ51355243 ScholiaQ51355243MaRDI QIDQ5363533FDOQ5363533


Authors: Lachlan J. Gunn, François Chapeau-Blondeau, Mark D. McDonnell, B. R. Davis, Andrew Allison, Derek Abbott Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 29 September 2017

Published in: Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Is it possible for a large sequence of measurements or observations, which support a hypothesis, to counterintuitively decrease our confidence? Can unanimous support be too good to be true? The assumption of independence is often made in good faith, however rarely is consideration given to whether a systemic failure has occurred. Taking this into account can cause certainty in a hypothesis to decrease as the evidence for it becomes apparently stronger. We perform a probabilistic Bayesian analysis of this effect with examples based on (i) archaeological evidence, (ii) weighing of legal evidence, and (iii) cryptographic primality testing. We find that even with surprisingly low systemic failure rates high confidence is very difficult to achieve and in particular we find that certain analyses of cryptographically-important numerical tests are highly optimistic, underestimating their false-negative rate by as much as a factor of 280.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1601.00900




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