Multi-attacker protocol validation
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Publication:540676
DOI10.1007/s10817-010-9185-yzbMath1213.94077OpenAlexW2046147156MaRDI QIDQ540676
Giampaolo Bella, Wihem Arsac, Luca Compagna, Xavier Chantry
Publication date: 3 June 2011
Published in: Journal of Automated Reasoning (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10817-010-9185-y
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Uses Software
Cites Work
- Formal correctness of security protocols.
- A calculus for cryptographic protocols: The spi calculus
- Protocol insecurity with a finite number of sessions and composed keys is NP-complete.
- Validating Security Protocols under the General Attacker
- Relating Strand Spaces and Distributed Temporal Logic for Security Protocol Analysis
- LTL model checking for security protocols
- Computer Aided Verification
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